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In search of the global political space  
Or Rosenboim, Journal of Politics, Religion and Ideology.  
 
It is my pleasure to be part of this forum. I would like to thank the reviewers for their 
insightful remarks and such challenging questions. I am also grateful to Jacob Hamburger 
and the editorial team of the journal for their work and for providing space for this 
discussion.   
 
The Emergence of Globalism is an intellectual history of political spaces. It argues that mid-
twentieth century political thinkers in Britain and the United States diagnosed global 
interconnectedness as the defining element of their era. This new condition required new 
interpretations of world order, which they envisaged under the banner of ‘globalism’. Each 
chapter examines a conversation involving public intellectuals active in the US and Britain 
during and after the Second World War. Together, these thinkers form a loose network of 
international thinkers, united by a concern with the global dimension of politics. The 
protagonists of the study include Raymond Aron, David Mitrany, Owen Lattimore, Nicholas 
J. Spykman, Barbara Wootton, Lionel Robbins, Friedrich Hayek, Lionel Curtis, Clarence 
Streit, H. G. Wells, Michael Polanyi, Lewis Mumford, Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, Richard 
McKeon, Jacques Maritain and Luigi Sturzo. They all shared a perception of the world as 
increasingly global, and a concern with the desirable and possible world order in the global 
age. 
 
The book revolves around five thematic discussions organised by order of scale, from the 
state to the universe. By drawing on scholarship in geopolitics, political theory, imperial 
studies, economics, law, philosophy and science and religion, the book seeks to widen the 
intellectual horizons of international thought and investigate sources that have not been 
previously recognised as important for shaping visions of world order. The book aims to 
outline the contours—rather than provide a definitive image—of the globalist debates about 
world order that had taken place in Britain and the United States during the mid-twentieth 
century.  
 
One of the questions raised by the reviewers in this forum touches upon this notion of 
political spaces: what kind of political space is the ‘global’, and how does it differ from the 
national and transnational spaces of politics? In the mid-twentieth century, technological 
interconnectedness often appeared as a challenge to the existing system of independent states 
and empires, which had already been destabilised by the Second World War. But as Daniel 
Gorman notes, the growing attention to the world dimension of political order did not 
undermine the importance of states and nations as political units. International or 
transnational spaces were relevant for their discussion, but not sufficient. The argument that I 
make in the book is that national, international, and transnational spaces were measured 
against the backdrop of a ‘global’ political space that encompassed the entirety of the planet. 
The nation-state could be part of the new globalist order, but it was not a necessary or 
indispensable component.  
 
The prime target of the globalists was the exclusionary and discriminatory ideology of 
nationalism, which they identified as the cause of the Second World War. The globalists 
recognised the state’s role in shaping identities, but they did not embrace the state as the 
desirable basic unit of world order. If states were to survive in a global system, national 
politics had to be imagined as part of a spatial and conceptual matrix that encompassed the 
entire globe. Unlike the interwar internationalists examined by Glenda Sluga and others, mid-
century globalists did not envisage world politics in terms of nation-states and the relations 
between them. They saw nation-states as one out of many possible political structures in the 
global age. Federations, regional blocs, democratic unions, and functional agencies were 
imagined as alternative or additional units in a global order. The global space of the 1940s 
was intended to be more diverse and pluralistic than the world of states and empires imagined 
by interwar internationalists.   
 
For Dario Fazzi, the global and transnational spaces can often overlap. In contemporary 
literature, globalism and transnationalism are sometimes used interchangeably, but I argue 
that the term ‘globalism’ is more helpful for understanding the political ideas that motivated 
the mid-century visions of world order that this book is concerned with. ‘Transnationalism’ 
denotes the phenomenon of the diminishing importance of boundaries between states. Yet 
unlike ‘globalism’, this term does not necessarily reflect a specific spatial scale. It does not 
necessarily convey the image of a united globe, of a unitary spatial entity that stood in the 
centre of the world-spanning mid-century visions of world order that I examine. What 
mattered for these mid-century thinkers was to imagine a world order that could—
potentially—encompass the whole world.  
 
As Slobodian and Fazzi both suggest in their insightful comments, writing the history of 
globalism as a political idea in the twentieth century runs two methodological risks, relating 
to the timeframe and the protagonists of the study. Were the thinkers that I discuss the only 
ones who envisaged globalism as an important political concept for thinking about the post-
war world order? Did their globalist reflections emerge and disappear in the period between 
1939 and 1950? These are important questions that require serious consideration.  
 
The spatial focus of the book on Britain and the United States is motivated by two historical 
considerations. First, during the period in question, these countries provided a relative safe 
haven for free public debate which was not available elsewhere. In Europe, authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes set a strict limit to freedom of expression and speech. London, New 
York, Chicago, and California hosted émigré intellectuals who sought to influence the post-
war world order by participating in local debates about international affairs. Second, since the 
early stages of the war, the British and American governments engaged in planning a new 
world order for the post-war era. While the scholars that I discuss were not necessarily 
involved in official plans of recovery and reconstruction, they were certainly inspired to 
propose their own visions and perhaps influence public opinion and official policies.  
 
In this light, Fazzi’s claim that ‘the spatial-temporal coordinates of the debate on globalism 
offered by the book are problematic, and confining them to the postwar Anglo-Saxon cultural 
milieu risks to be reductionist’ misses the point. The book is intentionally focused on the 
British and American spheres, since these were particularly important for the development 
and subsequent implementation of ideas about world order in the 1940s. As Andrew 
Williams and others have shown, post-war reconstruction was a key concern for Americans 
and British during the war, and the idea of the book is to present some of the scholarly and 
public conversations that happened alongside the drafting of formal plans and new 
institutions.  
The book’s protagonists were indeed mostly white, educated, Western males, who could be 
easily described as elitist. Yet, they came from different cultural, national, and ideological 
backgrounds, and would not have identified themselves as part of a homogeneous social 
group. At the same time, as I tried to show, they were part of a loose network of thinkers who 
were met personally or read each other’s works. The relative absence of women from this 
story is reflected, to my mind, in the title of Barbara Wootton’s memoir: In a World I Never 
Made. Her story is indicative of the difficulties facing women who sought to leave an imprint 
on public debate in mid-century Britain. Similarly, Elizabeth Mann, who served as secretary 
of the Chicago constitution committee, did not participate in the committee’s discussions or 
sign the final document.  
 
To what extent did the political category of globalism define the ideas of these mid-century 
intellectuals? For Joel Mouric, the Cold War set the premises for Aron’s thought throughout 
the 1940s. In this sense, Mouric wonders whether Aron was really a globalist, or rather a 
thinker of the state in the Cold War era. Mouric highlights the interpretative framework of 
Aron’s thought, which identifies the tensions between the Communist and Capitalist blocks 
as the foundation of his thinking on international relations. In the book, I sought to look at 
Aron’s writings from a different perspective, as part of a British debate on world order. By 
examining his reflection on the consequences of the planetary post-war order for the state, I 
sought to propose a diverse key for reading Aron’s ideas, situated not only in the context of 
French politics or Cold War bipolarism, but also in that of the growing attention to the global 
dimension of politics. It is in this context, I argue, that juxtaposing Aron with Mitrany and 
Carr helps shed light on a shared concern: outlining a realist proposal for the future of the 
state in the global post-war order.  
 
Other mid-century thinkers were doubtlessly concerned with post-war order. Figures like 
John Foster Dulles, Ralph Bunch or Hannah Arendt definitely merit scholarly attention in this 
context. But though their visions might be the subject of future historical research, they were 
not part of the historical conversations that I trace in The Emergence of Globalism. As I state 
in the book, I make no claim to have the final word on the history of globalism and globalist 
thinkers. Rather, I hope that other thinkers of globalism and other domains of international 
thought—such as militarism, socialist internationalism, peace activism, educationm and mass 
media, as Fazzi proposes—will be the subjects of future historical investigations.  
 
Slobodian writes that the ‘selection of protagonists may have doomed the inquiry from the 
start’. This judgement depends, of course, on the inquiry’s aim. The main objective of this 
study was not to identify a worthy or normatively desirable globalist vision in the 1940s. 
Rather, the book seeks to chart the ambitions—and limits—of globalist thinkers who sought 
to use their academic and scholarly prestige as jumping board to influence public opinion on 
world order. As Daniel Gorman notes, most of them enjoyed a prestigious social status; they 
chaired university department, contributed to widely read newspapers, led popular political 
organizations, inspired religious believers, and were members of cultural and political 
associations. Their social position made these authors particularly interesting for this study, 
which treats them as ‘public intellectuals’. This term does not imply here a normative 
position about the moral responsibility of the scholar in the public sphere. I use it as a 
historical description of scholars who had explicit intention to reach beyond their intellectual 
circles and speak to a ‘public’ (imagined or concrete) in conferences, meetings, newspaper 
articles, speeches, pamphlets, and books. They had, in Gorman’s words, the ‘intellectual 
prestige and social capital’ to attract an audience for their visions of world order. The 
tensions between their democratic ethos and elitist presumptions were sometimes 
acknowledged (for example, by Wootton, Lattimore, or McKeon) but still not easily 
overcome. In this sense, the book offers a critical reflection on the ambitions of intellectuals 
to shape political debate, then and now.  
 
The timeframe of this study has also raised questions by contributors to this forum. Did the 
idea of globalism really disappear after 1950? Were there no continuities with earlier 
conceptualizations of global order under the auspices of the League of Nations? As an 
intellectual historian, I recognize the inevitable continuities that characterize international 
thought in the twentieth century. Ideas evolve and transform over time; they rarely appear out 
of the blue or disappear without a trace. Yet I tried to highlight in the book how the mid-
century period was characterized with a sense of urgency about the need to create a globalist 
vision of a specific kind: a globalism of political forms that would create a novel political 
order for the world. Indeed, earlier international thinkers influenced 1940s globalist ideas of 
world order, yet the League of Nations was rarely discussed as a viable or desirable model. 
Many 1940s globalist proposals were not based on supranational organizations, but rather on 
a different political structure, such as regional blocks, federations, or functional networks of 
agencies. The historical path from the League to the United Nations was not linear; there 
were many roads not taken, some of which I discuss in this book.   
 
In the book, I conclude that the rise of the Cold War mindset led many of the globalists to 
abandon their proposals for a new world order. Slobodian suggests in his comments that 
globalism did not, in fact, end in the 1950s, but rather that its legacy can be traced through 
the following decade in the establishment of new economic orders and in the Non-Aligned 
Movement. It is possible to draw a line of continuity between mid-century British and 
American globalist thought and later global institutions and structures. Lattimore’s tripolar 
globalist vision could be read as a precursor to the rise of the Third World as novel political 
space. Interesting differences are also evident; for example, Lattimore’s vision prioritised 
democracy over self-determination in a manner that would have been inacceptable to the 
signatories of the Bandung Declaration of 1955. The centrality of the state and the wariness 
of challenging the international system of states was characteristic of visions of world order 
after 1950, even when imagined on a global scale.  
 
Slobodian rightly argues that after 1950 globalism underwent a transformation: ‘the 
specifically political forms of globalism … lost out to more economic ones’. If later iterations 
of globalism were strongly tied to economic relations, the mid-century globalists provide a 
glimpse into the dilemmas of political imagination on a global scale. Mid-century globalism 
was characterised by an ambition to transform the political forms of world order by 
supplanting or supplementing the existing system of states and empires. By the early 1950s, 
these ambitions were abandoned by the book’s protagonists. While the Bretton Woods 
system was evidently grounded in political interests and intentions, it did not seek to 
transform the existing system of states or create new political structures. For economists like 
Hayek and Robbins, the establishment of a new economic order became a means to supersede 
the failed attempts to create a new global order in the 1940s. It was an alternative solution 
to—rather than the realisation of—their earlier federalist visions.  
 
Finally, I would like to make explicit the underlying argument that I intentionally left implicit 
in the book. As an intellectual historian, I trust my readers to do their own thinking and draw 
their conclusions from my historical account of globalism. Yet I would like to use the 
opportunity granted here to underline that this study is hardly intended as a quest for a 
normatively desirable globalist political vision. It was not my aim to write a political 
manifesto for or against globalism. Rather, by analysing mid-century globalist visions of 
world order I sought to reveal the challenges of imagining political order on a global scale, 
challenges which remain pertinent to contemporary attempts at globalist visions. Shedding 
light on the ambitions of intellectuals to envisage a new world order, the limits of their 
projects become equally apparent. Since the global political space still holds great relevance 
to contemporary theoretical and political debates, I hope that the experience of mid-century 
globalists can serve as a starting point for reflection for those in search for a new global order 
today.  
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